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The International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in 
Ljubljana, Slovenia, regularly analyses events in the Middle East and the Balkans. In 
view of the failure to implement the judgement in the Sejdić-Finci case adopted by 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, IFIMES has analysed current 
situation in relation to the vital constitutional changes and the background of the 
reconstruction of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and its cantons. The most interesting sections from the analysis entitled 
“SEJDIĆ-FINCI CASE IN THE SHADOW OF (INTER)MAFIA CLASHES” 
are published below. 
 
 
 
SEJDIĆ-FINCI CASE IN THE SHADOW OF 
(INTER)MAFIA CLASHES 
 
The leaders of the main political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina often meet at 
informal meetings. Those meetings are attended by presidents of the leading parties 
in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Social Democratic 
Party of BiH (SDPBiH), the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the 
Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Union for a Better Future of BiH (SBBBiH), 
Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZBiH) and 
Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990). 
 
Frequent informal meetings of party leaders point to the non-functioning of formal 
institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the majority of political decision-making 
taking place outside the state institutions. Formal institutions such as the Parliament 
represent merely the transmission of political will and agreements determined 
informally by party leaders. 
 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: 
 
At the recent meeting between Bosnian-Herzegovinian party leaders and EU high 
representatives in Brussels it was agreed that by 31 August 2012 BiH authorities 
should provide the solution for the implementation of the European Court ruling in 
the case of “Sejdić and Finci against Bosnia and Herzegovina”. 
 
WHAT IS HIDING BEHIND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF POWER? 
On December 22, 2009, the Grand Chamber the European Court of Human Rights 
(Applications Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) adopted the judgement in the Sejdić-
Finci case, finding that the applicants Dervo Sejdić (Roma) and Jakob Finci 
(Jewish) as the members of minority communities were deprived of their right to 
stand for election to the House of Peoples, which is contrary to Article 14 of the 
  
 
2 
European Convention (prohibition of discrimination in relation to the rights laid 
down in the Convention) in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, and 
to stand for election to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which represents a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 (general prohibition of discrimination).  
 
The judgement in the Sejdić-Finci case represents the most significant judgement 
adopted so far by the European Court of Human Rights against Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In the judgement Bosnia and Herzegovina was ordered to amend the 
provisions of its Constitution as well as the Election Act so as to enable the 
individuals who do not declare themselves as members of “constituent peoples” to 
stand for election as members of the BiH Presidency and delegates to the House of 
Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Analysts have warned that behind the discussions on the implementation of the 
Sejdić-Finci judgement attempts have been made to introduce certain fundamental 
constitutional changes by providing solutions for the implementation of the 
judgement that would enable certain political elites to take control over their 
respective ethnic communities and to form election units at their own will in order to 
control all social aspects in those units.  
 
 
SECRET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SDP and HDZ IN RELATION TO 
THE SEJDIĆ-FINCI JUDGEMENT 
Divergent opinions held by Bosnian-Herzegovinian political parties regarding the 
amendments of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina have prevented the 
implementation of the judgement in the Sejdić-Finci case. From the legal point of 
view, the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of “Sejdić 
and Finci against Bosnia and Herzegovina” questions the foundations of the 
constitutional system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most burning questions are 
how to change the relevant constitutional  provisions in order to enable individuals 
who are not members of the constituent peoples (i.e. belonging to ethnic minorities) 
to stand for election without jeopardising the present division of authority between 
the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Should the process of 
implementing this judgement be extended in order to amend other provisions of the 
Constitution which also represent the source of discrimination on the basis of ethnic 
origin? And most importantly, is the international community giving up the Dayton 
Agreement, or in other words, does the current pressure exerted by the international 
community on BiH authorities to implement the judgement in the Sejdić-Finci case 
represent a period of new constitutional uncertainty for Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Analysts have warned that the implementation of the judgement serves as the excuse 
for a new political reorganisation and that by introducing cosmetic changes required 
to remove the discriminating provisions against minorities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina the politicians are trying to introduce a new constitutional system 
through the back door. The implementation of the European Court decision has 
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opened new questions in relation to the judgement – while it would enable members 
of minority communities to stand for election to the Presidency of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina there would be no guarantee that they would actually be elected since 
the Constitution does not provide for a representative of ethnic minorities to be a 
member of the Presidency. This points to the absurdity of the implementation of the 
Sejdić-Finci judgement: if no minority representative or the fourth member of the 
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is ensured, the question of minority 
representation in the BiH Presidency would not be resolved by the Sejdić-Finci 
judgement. This inevitably leads to the need to introduce the fourth member of BiH 
Presidency and can incite constitutional changes that may eventually enable the state 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to have one common president. Bearing in mind that 
according to some estimates about one fifth of the population in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are minorities whose numbers even exceed those of Croats in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, this question will inevitably come on the agenda. Moreover, if the 
solution was reached in the House of Peoples it would mean that the representatives 
of minorities to the House of Peoples would be appointed by the representatives of 
constituent peoples through the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the National Assembly of Republika Srpska and not by minority 
representatives, which would be unacceptable. The most appropriate solution would 
be for minority representatives to the House of Peoples to be appointed at the state 
level by the Council of National Minorities. According to analysts' estimates 
minorities represent one of the healthiest parts of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society. 
 
The discussions and procedures taking place in the Council of Ministers and the 
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been discontinued for some unknown 
reasons, while the resolving of the most vital and fateful issues has been moved to the 
level of political parties where they have become the subject of interparty 
negotiations and political trading. An even more worrying fact is that the 
amendments of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina are being discussed 
without consulting any experts on the constitutional and international law. Secret 
meetings which have been taking place for one year between SDP and HDZ high 
officials Lidija Korać (SDP), Josip Merdža (HDZ), Saša Magazinović (SDP) 
and Borjana Krišto (HDZ), who are definitely no legal experts, can not help Bosnia 
and Herzegovina on its way to implement the Sejdić-Finci judgement, but merely 
point to the lack of transparency on the political scene in this country.  
 
Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not imply the privatisation 
of the state, therefore European officials engaging in inter-party negotiations should 
be aware that everywhere in the world and in Europe, except in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, discussions on constitutional amendments are not held at private party 
meetings but in the highest legislative bodies and in consultation with experts. 
 
The pressure exerted by the EU in view of the implementation of the Sejdić-Finci 
judgement and setting this as the condition for EU accession of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina represents another mistake in European politics. Requiring domestic 
politicians to take some decisions on their own undermines the foundations of the 
Dayton Agreement and opens Pandora's Box, bringing Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
political insecurity. The imposition of asymmetrical and partial solutions by the EU, 
that would actually change the vital parts of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, leads to a political crisis in this country and yet another manipulation of 
its citizens. The most illustrative example of the manipulation of Bosnian-
Herzegovinian citizens is the absolute disregard of minority representatives in all 
negotiations related to the implementation of the Sejdić-Finci judgement. Instead of 
involving the representatives of minorities – which account for 1/5 of the population 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina – in the discussions on legal proposals and solutions, they 
are ignored and removed from the decision-making process by the international 
community and domestic political actors. This actually proves the intention of 
individual political elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina to apply some cosmetic changes 
in order to redesign the political and legal system with the aim to promote the 
interests of certain constituent peoples and further strengthen the instruments of 
power between and within those constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Current solutions according to which BiH Presidency member from the Republika 
Srpska entity would be elected directly while the member from the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina would be elected indirectly through the Parliament mean 
that BiH Presidency would be reduced to a satellite function, making it hostage to the 
political will of the leading parties in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Analysts believe that the present situation resembles that in 2000/2001 when certain 
political parties from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina enabled the present 
positions of the president of Republika Srpska, prime minister of Republika Srpska 
and speaker of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska to be occupied only by the 
representatives of the Serbian people instead of ensuring equal representation of 
Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks at these three highest functions. The political hoaxes 
about the authentic and non-authentic representatives of individual nations are 
hiding behind cosmetic political actions as well as current activities to implement the 
European Court judgement regarding human rights of ethnic minorities. The 
appropriate path would therefore be to start eliminating the existing asymmetries 
related to entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina instead of creating new asymmetries. 
 
Being the authors of the Dayton Agreement, both the EU and the US should be 
actively involved in the implementation of the Sejdić-Finci judgement in order to stop 
its private implementation. The implementation of the judgement should be brought 
back in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, 
representatives of Bosnian-Herzegovinian minority nations should be involved in the 
discussion on possible solutions for the Sejdić-Finci judgement. 
 
The representatives and leaders of parliamentary parties bear and will bear the 
responsibility for partial and inadequate changes to the Dayton Agreement, since the 
implementation of the Sejdić-Finci judgement should be carried out on the basis of 
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the guarantees and the clear position of the international community (notably the 
US) who is the author and the guarantor of the Dayton Agreement. For example, 
regarding the failed constitutional amendments in 2006 the international community 
had insisted on the comprehensive reorganisation of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and categorically opposed partial and asymmetric solutions. 
 
(INTER)MAFIA CLASHES 
 
The announcement made by the president of the Union for a Better Future of BiH 
(SBBBiH) Fahrudin Radončić that he will eradicate state mafia and tear out its 
heart sounds very cynical. This statement could attract the attention of lay public 
outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no 
organised fighting against mafia but rather (inter)mafia clashes or the fighting of one 
political-criminal group against another political-criminal group, of which the one 
currently in power misuses state institutions in order to realise its goals. 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is thus in an absurd situation where mafia leaders are 
undertaking the fight against mafia. The origin of property belonging to political 
leaders who are meeting at informal meetings still has not been investigated. Analysts 
have warned that for the past 15 years a global crisis has been present in the printed 
media with even some leading newspaper houses being unable to survive on the 
market. On the other hand, certain printed media in Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
reached fantastic business results, which justifiably raises doubts about their 
connections with organised crime. 
 
FOUR OUT OF SEVEN LEADERS CANDIDATES FOR THE “BLACKLIST
 
While the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina might appear quite confusing 
to those who are not familiar with the political scene in this country, several 
directions of political development are clearly visible. 
 
Citizen protests in Banja Luka represent an introduction into the fall of Milorad 
Dodik's regime and remind of events in 2004 when Dodik initiated protests in Banja 
Luka as the centre of Republika Srpska, which led to the overthrowing of SDS 
government. Investigations carried out against Dodik in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Lithuania regarding cash transfers will reveal Dodik's real character 
even to his most loyal followers. 
 
Implementation of the Sejdić-Finci judgement represents an introduction into radical 
constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
If SDP continues its present policy it will lose a significant share of popularity which 
will most probably lead to the end of political career for Zlatko Lagumdžija. 
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The so called “blacklist” will see some changes with certain individuals from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina being erased while the names of some current political party leaders 
will be put on it. As many as four out of seven current political leaders will most 
probably be blacklisted. 
 
Recent decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on war gains 
in which it held that such property should be owned by the state and not by the entity 
points to the strengthening of state institutions as one of the preconditions for 
speeding up EU accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
The fight against organised crime will show its first results with the prosecution of 
present and past leading politicians and functionaries at the state, entity, canton and 
municipality levels. This will create the situation in which mafia leaders will no longer 
be able to present themselves to the public as fighters against mafia. 
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